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As 2015 came to an end, the number of migrants 
smuggled to Greece and Italy throughout the year 
exceeded the million mark. This has turned the Med-
iterranean into the deadliest route into Europe. A 
radical increase in the number of deaths has accom-
panied the rising number of clandestine migrants. 
Since 1988, around 20,000 of these migrants have 
lost their lives in the Mediterranean, the biggest 
spikes being in the last three years: in the first four 
months of 2015 alone, about 1,800 people died in 
their attempt to reach Europe. To this figure, we must 
add the, presumably very high, number of those who 
died but whose bodies have never turned up. This 
tragedy has generated a real state of emergency in 
Europe during the last few years, with public opinion 
confused and horrified by pathetic photos of corps-
es lying on the shores and outsiders trying to force 
their way through Europe’s security fences. Dramat-
ic photos of migrants crammed into wretched boats 
circulate in the media. These images accompany 
journalistic accounts that tell stories of poor and 
desperate individuals deceived by organized crime 
cartels. All this has persuaded political leaders and 
authorities to view clandestine migration as a war, in 
which the evil is represented by the smugglers. But 
who are the smugglers? And how do they operate? 
What convinces migrants to put their lives in the 
smugglers’ hands? 
In contemporary mainstream narratives on migra-
tion, the answer to these questions is straightfor-
ward: smuggling networks are mafia-like cartels of 
hardened and greedy criminals dedicated to the 
systematic deceiving and conning of migrants. 
These facilitators of irregular migration have earned 
worldwide notoriety as orchestrators of human mas-
sacres, evil geniuses behind criminal trade, or 
amassers of untold riches made at the expense of 
their victims. The rhetoric that characterizes human 
smugglers as greedy, callous and immoral has ac-
companied one-dimensional understandings of mi-
grants as infantile and ignorant. The potency of 
these narratives has in turn been effective at igniting 
the public’s moral outrage against human smug-
gling and justifying the progressive criminalization 
of irregular migration.
While successful at activating public opinion and 
policy makers, mainstream narratives of smuggling 
networks have consistently failed to address the in-
ner dynamics of the phenomenon and provide an 
adequate understanding of the relationship be-
tween smugglers and migrants. Of course, smug-
glers often constitute the only available option for 
those individuals who flee a situation of immediate 
danger and distress. However, migrants and asylum 
seekers’ desperate need to find refuge and their dif-
ficulties in accessing legal channels of mobility are 
not enough to explain the resilience and strength of 
the bonds between them and the smugglers. 
This is precisely why we urgently need a more nu-
anced understanding of smuggling and the actors 
involved. This aim acquires greater significance 
within the broader goal of reinforcing EU Member 
States’ control over their borders and ensuring mi-
grants’ safety. With this task in mind, this paper will 
first consider the complexity of the phenomenon by 
looking at the evolution of human smuggling in the 
Mediterranean Sea. It will then focus on the struc-
ture and modus operandi of the smuggling networks 
operating in the area. In so doing, this paper will 
conclude by demonstrating that the control of mi-
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gration and the safety of migrants are not at odds 
with one another. However, this twofold goal re-
quires a response other than the mere militarization 
of borders.
The Routes
Smugglers channel migrant streams to Europe 
across three major sea routes. The western Medi-
terranean route has long been a major conduit for 
human smugglers moving migrants into Europe via 
Morocco. This route has been an important entry 
point for North African and sub Saharan irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers since 2005. These mi-
grants usually have two options for reaching the 
sea: the longest is to travel along the West African 
coastline; a shorter option consists in a short yet 
dangerous journey through the Sahara. The coastal 
route has often been preferred by migrants who 
judge the desert crossing to be too risky. According 
to the EU border control agency Frontex, migrants 
travelling along this route were originally labour mi-
grants from Algeria and Morocco seeking employ-
ment in the richer markets of southern Europe. Over 
time, the nature of the flow progressively changed 
as growing numbers of asylum seekers fleeing po-
litical turmoil and warfare in Mali, Sudan, South Su-
dan, Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and the Central Afri-
can Republic joined the former group. Since 2010, 
the overall number of migrants using this corridor 
decreased significantly. Several factors can explain 
this drop in numbers. First and foremost, stricter law 
enforcement by the Moroccan and Spanish authori-
ties seems to have a played a decisive role in the 
termination of the route. However, the trend can 
also be explained by the fact that many migrants de-
cided to depart from Libya, where the likelihood of 
being returned by EU border authorities is much 
less, and the shrinking of the migratory flow follow-
ing the rising rate of unemployment in Spain.
The second is the central route, which begins in Lib-
ya and travels across to the Italian and Maltese 
coastlines. After a brief interruption in irregular 
crossings in 2009, following a bilateral agreement 
between Italy and Libya, the route registered a peak 
in arrivals after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 
2011, when almost 70,000 migrants – mostly Tuni-
sians and sub-Saharan Africans – landed on Italian 
and Maltese shores. The flow decreased steadily 
with the downfall of the Gaddafi regime in late 2011 
and almost stopped completely during 2012. By 
2013, however, political unrest in the region lead to 
an increase in the number of people seeking asylum 
and favoured the consolidation of smuggling net-
works along the North African coasts. Smugglers 
typically put migrants aboard wretched boats head-
ing for Italian coasts. These boats are equipped 
with poor engines and often have insufficient fuel to 
reach Europe. For these reasons, even though au-
thorities disembark migrants mostly in Apulia and 
Calabria, detection of irregular migrants generally 
occurs at sea. Migratory pressure decreased again 
in 2014, falling to 154,000, about a tenth lower than 
the figures registered in 2014. This is likely due to 
the opening up of the eastern Mediterranean route, 
which is less risky and expensive for migrants. Traf-
fic along the route, however, remains intense and 
smuggling networks continue to operate in Libya, 
where most migrants – largely Eritreans, Nigerians 
and Somalis – gather before the sea crossing. 
The third pathway is the eastern Mediterranean 
route through Turkey and Greece, which came into 
frequent use during 2015. From 1991 to 2001, it 
was one of the most used points of entry for mi-
grants – originally Albanians – fleeing economic 
and political turmoil. After a drop in the detection 
of illegal migrants throughout the 2000s, the route 
has recently regained popularity as a major arrival 
point. Since 2015, Frontex has registered record 
numbers in illegal border-crossings: almost 
1,000,000 people – mostly Syrians, Afghans and 
other asylum seekers – entered Europe via Turkey 
and Greece. A large share of these migrants have 
made their way to EU Member States via the so-
called Balkan route – i.e. the corridor that crosses 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Serbia into Hungary and/or Croatia and then on to-
wards western Europe. The escalation of the Syri-
an conflict and the recrudescence of political in-
stability in the area substantially increased the 
number of migrants travelling along this route. 
However, this trend is not only related to political 
instability and warfare. Radical changes in transit 
countries’ border controls and the proliferation of 
smuggling networks in Istanbul and other Turkish 
cities also played a major role in the dramatic in-
crease of arrivals in Europe. 
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On 20 March 2016, the agreement between some 
EU Member States and Turkey almost completely 
halted the irregular migrant flow along the Balkan 
route. We are currently witnessing the resurgence 
of irregular migration along other routes – most no-
tably the central one.
Smuggling Networks: Organizational 
Structure and Modus Operandi
Smuggling networks have earned worldwide notori-
ety as mafia-like cartels that run a number of other 
illicit businesses alongside human smuggling 
– most notably drug, human and arms trafficking. 
The available evidence, however, rules out the exist-
ence of major crime syndicates operating in the 
Mediterranean Sea. The considerable instability of 
the current irregular migratory flows explains the na-
ture of the business. Human smuggling involves 
flexible and adaptive networks that can deal with a 
market characterized by fast-changing scenarios 
and great insecurity. As a matter of fact, smuggling 
networks active in the area consist of a system 
of flexible and independent – and largely family-
based – organizations that enter into partnerships 
with one another for short periods. Furthermore, 
even though authorities have at times reported the 
overlapping of people smuggling with drug, arms 
and human trafficking, empirical evidence has 
shown that these groups do not generally run all 
these different ‘enterprises’ together. 
Research undertaken in different parts of the Medi-
terranean has also shown that human smuggling in-
volves a very different modus operandi depending 
on the origin of the smugglers, the client group, and 
the smuggling route. Ideally, smuggling groups can 
be situated somewhere in the continuum between 
single-service providers and multi-service networks. 
The former are small groups that run the sea cross-
ing and often have solid roots in the local commu-
nity. They do not have ties within the migrants’ coun-
tries of origin, and the recruitment happens through 
intermediary groups. These groups generally serve 
migrants who travel alone, mostly legally, for a large 
part of the journey. Migrants would recur to smug-
glers only to cross a specific leg of their journey. Be-
tween 2011 and 2015, thousands of Syrian asylum 
seekers going to Europe relied on smuggling ser-
vices almost exclusively for crossing the Turkish-
Greek border. They travelled regularly to Turkey 
where smugglers arranged transportation to Les-
bos or any other Greek island near the Turkish sea 
border. Once in Greece, Syrians continued their 
journey to Europe on their own. 
Smuggling networks active in the 
area consist of a system of flexible 
and independent – and largely 
family-based – organizations that 
enter into partnerships with one 
another for short periods. Even 
though authorities have at times 
reported the overlapping of people 
smuggling with drug, arms and 
human trafficking, empirical evidence 
has shown that these groups do not 
generally run all these different 
‘enterprises’ together
At the other end of the spectrum, there are larger 
and wider-ranging networks that have offshoots in 
migrants’ countries of origin. These organizations 
operate either land, air or sea routes and provide 
customers with a variety of services that range from 
border crossings to detention centre releases. 
These types of migrant-smuggling services are of-
ten used by migrants who are barred from legal en-
try in the transit countries. In such cases, the smug-
gling of migrants occurs through a ‘pre-organized, 
stage-to-stage’ process. A chain of independently 
but closely interacting ‘stage coordinators’ organiz-
es the migration process by outsourcing certain 
smuggling activities to local coordinators – often in-
dividuals with solid ties in the local community of 
transit countries. The latter, in turn, subcontract the 
border crossing to the local service providers. Inter-
estingly, recent studies have dismissed the exist-
ence of a mastermind or ‘boss’ who presides over 
the entire smuggling process. Indeed, it would hard-
ly be possible for a single centralized organization to 
carry out all services alone along a route that com-
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prises journeys of several thousand kilometres and 
in a market characterized by high levels of instability 
and unpredictability.
Empirical evidence has also demonstrated that 
smuggling groups have a highly distinct yet flexible 
structure with roles that are not integrated into rigid 
hierarchies and bound by long-term agreements. 
These flexible organizations have, however, a few re-
curring figures that can be pinpointed. Firstly, there 
is the group coordinator. Acting as a manager, this 
person is in charge of overseeing smuggling opera-
tions and the overall management of the organiza-
tion. The recruiter, the person in charge of establish-
ing contacts between smugglers and migrants, cov-
ers another important role. He or she often shares 
the same ethnic background of the majority as those 
being smuggled and may have the same origin. An-
other fundamental role in the organization is cov-
ered by the ‘passeur’ – the person responsible for 
escorting migrants across the border. A number of 
other figures participate in the business: forgers, 
enforcers, receivers, and drivers. Finally, around 
these relatively loose and small organizations gravi-
tate a considerable number of people – often locals 
– who work as freelancers. They could work for a 
fee as lookouts by using lights to signal the pres-
ence of police forces patrolling the shores, as cost-
ly taxi-drivers by taking migrants to the point of em-
barkation, or also as landowners, if they have land 
near the shore that they can rent to refugees and 
migrants waiting to depart. 
Migrants and Smugglers
Politicians, border authorities, and journalists usu-
ally portray the smuggler as a cruel and reckless 
criminal driven exclusively by profits. This under-
standing, however, offers very little indication of the 
reasons why smuggling begins or continues in a 
certain context. The resilience of smuggling net-
works, amid numerous attempts by nation states 
and border control agencies to crack down on them, 
speaks not only of migrants’ determination to flee 
their countries, but also of the strong bond between 
smugglers and their customers. 
My own research on smuggling networks operat-
ing in the eastern Mediterranean confirms the find-
ings of other researchers who have questioned 
over-simplistic depictions of the facilitator-traveller 
relationship and their community dimensions. As a 
matter of fact, smuggling has a rather positive rep-
utation among many migrant communities. Smug-
glers represent themselves as service-providers 
who satisfy a need that people cannot satisfy 
through legal channels. Surprisingly, such self-rep-
resentation is often backed up by irregular mi-
grants who consider smugglers to be either philan-
thropists who save others or ordinary people who 
just want to make some money. In fact, the com-
plex relationship between smugglers and migrants 
ranges from the altruistic assistance provided by 
family members or friends to dynamics of exploita-
tion based on the intent of hardened criminals. Em-
pirical research, however, confirms that trust and 
cooperation seem to be the rule more than the ex-
ception in the interaction between smugglers and 
migrants. Many authors have showed how the na-
ture of the interactions between facilitators and mi-
grants may well go beyond the existence of eco-
nomic interests and rest on deep social ties span-
ning across countries.
The resilience of smuggling 
networks, amid numerous attempts 
by nation states and border control 
agencies to crack down on them, 
speaks not only of migrants’ 
determination to flee their countries, 
but also of the strong bond between 
smugglers and their customers
Smuggling requires a great deal of trust. It is un-
surprising that current restrictive immigration and 
asylum policy measures in the Mediterranean Sea 
have not only been unsuccessful as a deterrent, 
but have also been counterproductive by redirect-
ing migrant flows through illegal channels. Picking 
the right smuggler may depend on good fortune 
and migrants are certainly at the mercy of their 
smugglers during their journey to Europe. In this 
sense, the fact that migrant smuggling may at 
times be rooted in social ties between smugglers 
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and their customers does not necessarily protect 
the latter against exploitation and violence. Yet 
smuggling is a business, and like any other busi-
ness it requires a certain level of trust. Indeed for 
migrants, smugglers constitute a valuable re-
source, the only escape from a situation of misery 
and extreme danger. At the same time, smugglers 
also depend in part on the migrants to find pro-
spective clients. Those people who survive the 
journey can operate as a pull factor by tempting 
their kin and friends to embark on a similar journey. 
Successfully smuggled migrants who I interviewed 
favoured smuggling networks over legal channels 
of resettlement to reunite with their families who 
remained in their country of origin. 
As a matter of fact, smuggling has 
a rather positive reputation among 
many migrant communities. 
Smugglers represent themselves as 
service-providers who satisfy a need 
that people cannot satisfy through 
legal channels
Most importantly, however, the belief that human 
smuggling could not only be a legitimate – albeit 
criminalized – form of labour, but also even a mor-
al duty can pave the way for migrants’ involvement 
in the business. A situation that it is also favoured 
by the protracted condition of illegality experi-
enced by many of them in the context of a Euro-
pean containment policy, aimed at preventing mi-
grants and refugees from entering the territory 
of EU Member States. In this sense, refugees, 
asylum seekers and labour migrants may work 
as either recruiters, passeurs or intermediaries 
– positions that are often covered by the same 
person. They might escort migrants across the 
border because of their own first-hand knowl-
edge of the route. They might recruit clients that 
share the same ethnic networks. They provide mi-
grants with the different services they need (food, 
accommodation, etc.) thanks to their long-term re-
lationship with the local communities in the transit 
countries. They do all this in order to pay the re-
quired fees or make a decent living, or most likely 
because they do not find any moral contradiction 
in what they do.
In this regard, it is important to introduce a differ-
entiation. If the smuggler-migrant relationship is 
informed by co-operative experiences and forms 
of conviviality, this does not presuppose an all-em-
bracing harmony of interaction between smug-
glers and their customers. The strong social 
bonds that some researchers have witnessed may 
obviously be facilitated by the fact that smugglers 
and migrants share the same ethnic backgrounds 
or other social ties. In this sense, the establish-
ment of smuggling networks on an ethnic basis 
serves to reinforce what some authors aptly call 
‘chains of trust’ – ethnic solidarities between 
smugglers and migrants that tend to fade the fur-
ther migrants travel from their country of origin. 
Smugglers would thus prioritize the transport of 
their fellow nationals and carry some of them 
– generally children, some political refugees, the 
elderly and the disabled – who cannot afford to 
pay the full fee. The establishment of a smuggling 
network works to protect fellow nationals from the 
systematic exploitation of smugglers of different 
ethnic backgrounds. However, when these ties of 
kinship and ethnicity fade, migrants’ likelihoods 
of being abused and exploited are likely to rise 
dramatically.
Toward an Effective Response 
In light of the need to develop an adequate policy 
response to human smuggling, a better compre-
hension of the phenomenon is pivotal to ensuring 
the stability of the receiving State and the security 
of the migrant. Empirical evidence shows that hu-
man smuggling across the eastern Mediterranean 
is the sum of highly heterogeneous organizations 
operating on a small scale and in a short time-
frame; that these groups are characterized by the 
lack of solid hierarchies and the existence of inter-
changeable figures; that they provide a service 
that is in great demand without necessarily exploit-
ing their clients; and that the smuggler and the 
customer may, at times, be the same person. An 
effective eradication of these organizations with-
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out addressing the causes of clandestine migra-
tion may thus prove problematic when it comes to 
smuggling networks that are deeply enmeshed 
within migratory flows. 
The first decisive step toward a more 
durable radical solution for the 
current crisis demands the opening 
of new channels of legal entry and 
the reinforcement of existing ones 
for refugees and asylum seekers, 
presumably the majority of people 
smuggled by sea
Nonetheless, EU efforts remain overwhelmingly 
focused on implementing a security-based policy. 
The creation of the European border agency Fron-
tex in 2004 and the more recent EU-Turkish agree-
ment of March 2016 have been clear steps in this 
direction. Border controls play a crucial role in re-
straining human smuggling activities. That said, a 
number of undesired outcomes ultimately out-
weigh the intended goals of a security-oriented 
control policy. First, sea border operations are of-
ten inefficient. The evolution of smuggling across 
the Mediterranean corridors demonstrates this 
with dramatic clarity. Not only has the vastness of 
the patrolled area hindered the extent of these op-
erations and prompted spiralling financial costs, 
but also effectively blocking smuggling networks 
has redirected unauthorized migration flows along 
different routes. Second, the tightening of border 
controls generally exposes migrants to greater 
dangers. Wary of heightening the risks, smugglers 
seek to limit the chances of being apprehended by 
employing a variety of strategies – such as setting 
off on longer and therefore more dangerous jour-
neys, choosing unsafe points of embarkation and 
disembarkation, adopting riskier manoeuvres to 
escape authorities, and abandoning their cargo 
on vessels in rough seas. Even in the case of suc-
cessfully preventing migrants leaving transit coun-
tries (such as Libya, Mauritania or Morocco), we 
are left wondering whether this outcome would ul-
timately benefit them or aggravate their plight. 
Many accounts have reported how local authori-
ties in these countries have arbitrarily arrested, 
mistreated and abused migrants. Third, the milita-
rization of border controls may ultimately trigger a 
vicious dynamic. Researchers have demonstrated 
that the increase in the effectiveness of control 
policies has accompanied a growing tendency of 
these groups to specialize and to increase their 
capacity of delivering specialized services to 
would-be migrants in a systematic and standard-
ized manner.
Does this mean that smugglers should be left undis-
turbed? Certainly not. However, the urgency of the 
sea crossing calls for a combination of policy meas-
ures. Security measures can be effective only if ac-
companied by other solutions. A truly effective an-
swer to human smuggling would require the EU and 
its Member States to concentrate on reducing ‘de-
mand’ more than curbing ‘supply.’ Accordingly, the 
first decisive step toward a more durable radical so-
lution for the current crisis demands the opening of 
new channels of legal entry and the reinforcement 
of existing ones for refugees and asylum seekers, 
presumably the majority of people smuggled by sea. 
This should translate into: granting humanitarian vi-
sas; the creation of humanitarian corridors between 
transit countries and Europe; the expansion of Euro-
pean countries’ resettlement programmes; and the 
development of alternative legal routes for refugees 
– such as family reunification, university fellowships 
and scholarships, training programmes, private 
sponsorships, and labour mobility.
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